On April 2, 1982, Argentine troops landed near Puerto Argentino airport to recapture the Malvinas Islands, sparking a conflict with the United Kingdom. This country quickly deployed submarines to the South Atlantic and enlisted its powerful fleet. The arrival of the submarines in the disputed are acaused the Argentine government to suspend maritime supplies to the islands to facilitate diplomatic negotiations and ordered an airlift. The Argentine deployment to the islands and southern bases involved all military tactical transport aircraft available in the country, plus three commercial aircraft.
The Second Naval Air Mobile Logistics Support Squadron, based at the Ezeiza Naval Air Base; in command of Lieutenant Commander Norberto Ulises Pereiro, consisted of three F-28 Fellowship Mk.3000, one passenger version (0740/5-T-10) and two with reinforced floor and cargo door (0741/5-T-20 and 0742/5-T-21). They were joined by a Hawker Siddeley HS-125-400B aircraft for transfer of authorities. Their crews had excellent flight experience, achieved by supporting Argentine Navy units that periodically exercised in the south, and the usual ful filment of the Air Naval Transport Lines that linked the Naval Air bases.
On April 2, 0741/5-T-20 landed on the islands and returned to the main land with the remains of argentine Marine Lieutenant Commander Pedro Giachino, who had fallen during the fight at the house of the appointed British Governor for the islands.
The Squadron, aware of the magnitude of the logistical flights to come, called up the available pilots who had served in the unit. The numerous F-28 crossings to the islands departed from Río Grande Naval Air Base using a direct trajectory, a high altitude profile, day time conditions, and decreasing the payload from 7,000 kilos to 6,000 kilos to operate without refuelling on a short runway (1,250 meters long by 45 meters wide).
The congestion of cargo aircraft at Puerto Argentino and the small size of the apron made it necessary to coordinate flight schedules with the Argentine Air Force. The naval F-28s contributed to the deployment of naval aviation personnel and equipment, the Marine Infantry Battalion Nº 5, and all necessary supplies to the islands. They also participated in the transfer of the Infantry Battalion Nº 4 from Trelew to Río Grande.
Crossings to the islands generated a lot of enthusiasm, especially for those who were going for the first time. Even personnel from outside the Squadron requested to participate in order to experience such a thrill.
This phase allowed the F-28 crews to adapt to a changing weather, with intense winds, very low temperatures and reduced visibility due to fog or showers. It also permitted them to practice the short landing technique, to optimize unloading times and to become familiar with the precarious instrumental aids.
The approach of the Royal Navy Task Force made any diplomatic solution null and void, and the confrontation was inevitable. On April 30, the United Kingdom imposed a Total Exclusion Zone including the Argentine aircraft. That day, 0741/5-T-20 broke the blockade to transfer several fuel drums and fortunately did not encounter any major threats. On May 1st, British aircrafts attacked the Puerto Argentino airfield and the runway width was halved until the end of the conflict. This marked the beginning of a new phase with very different characteristics, and the F-28 crossings would become very risky. They would take place without air escort, self-defence weapons, active or passive means of counter measures for self-protection and without the possibility of ejection. In very low level flight over the sea, the only assistance available would be the Malvinas Radar, at approximately 20 nautical miles out.
On May 3 and 4, 0742/5-T-21 was deployed from Río Grande to the area where the cruiser ARA “General Belgrano” sank, with the mission of finding the life rafts, establish their position and maintain contact. Once the survivors returned to the mainland, they were taken back to their places of residence with numerous F-28 flights.
Usually the F-28 freighters were deployed in Río Grande, and the aircraft that were not on duty would spend the night in Ushuaia, to return early the next day. The crew assigned for the crossing to the islands remained in the vicinity waiting for a favourable tactical opportunity. Those moments were very tedious, nerves accumulated and fear surfaced, which disappeared at the time of departure. The concentration during the flight was maximum and there was no room for distractions. The problem was not to converge in route with missile ships and avoid being detected by their radars, which would alert the Sea Harrier CAPs. If that happened, little could be done.
The size and white colour of the F-28s made them easy to spot from above, where the Sea Harriers usually orbited. Malvinas radar support was essential to locate CAPs and determine flight continuity. Electronic silence was maintained and was only broken to communicate the position at pre-established points. The transponder was always off, the radar on standby and the navigation lights off. Turning on the radar meant giving away the position to the enemy. A Beechcraft B-200 or B-80 aircraft acted as a communications relay between Río Grande and the islands. Listening in on it provided updated information of the tactical situation.
The enemy disembark in San Carlos on May 21 made flight over the islands impossible and required a new maritime route to be traced from the south. The extension of the flights and the necessity to adopt lower flight level profiles in order to stay undetected by enemy ships required an increase in fuel and a reduction of the payload to 5 tons. The first 100 miles weref lown at an altitude of 1,300 meters, then descending to 180 meters and finally to 15 meters (50 feet) above the sea. In the radioaltimeter the lowest altitude to fly was selected and its light would turn on if the limit was exceeded.
Prior to take off from Río Grande, the Ground Proximity Warning System (GPWS) fuse was removed to avoid the annoying "Toolow flap" alarm. During the flight,the autopilot was engaged and in the middle of the trajectory the roll channel was turned off to fly more comfortably, maintaining the altitude automatically. Near the islands, the right thumb was kept on the steering wheel disconnect button in case of an unforeseen event. However, the pilots preferred to fly the final part of the trajectory manually.
On May 29, after observing a decrease in CAPs at night, flights began to take place after dusk and outsidethe British ships' cannonade schedule to Puerto Argentino.
The night time low flying at 300 knots was chilling. Passing through a snow shower or the very glare of the crest of the waves could make the pilot dizzy. The pilot flew instrumentally, covering his windshield with a curtain. The co-pilot alternated between monitoring the flight and looking out. The navigation and cockpit lights were always off, only a subtle red light illuminated the cockpit panels to facilitate external vision. Concentration was maximum, silence reigned and the suitability of each crew member in his role prevailed. The pilots were focused on flight technique and tactics, the mechanics were checking the safety of the cargo and the rear cabin observers were attentive to any circumstance.
The approach to the airfield was from the south sector. Near the islands, the tower was contacted to request runway data and turn on the VOR. Usually the low visibility required a standard instrument approach, but such exposure was very dangerous. The Squadron agreed to abandon the low flight 10 miles from the airfield and climb to 400 feet to intercept the final course of the approach about 5 miles out. The runway lighting was turned on at the very last moment, as well as the aircraft's main landing lights, and on final approach for landing the pilot would maintain threshold speed until touching down the right edge of the runway. The landing was abrupt, but the airplane stopped in a few meters. The landing gear absorbed the vibrations caused by the irregularities of a bombed runway without any inconvenience. The plane then would be turned 180 degrees to return to the west end where the unloading would begin, and the wounded and/or returning personnel boarded. The engines remained running with the crew ready to take off in the event of an air raid. After takeoff, the aircraft would turn sea ward to take a very low flying route to Río Grande.
These flights over the sea impregnated the fuselage and engines with salt and demanded washing the aircraft at Ezeiza Naval Air Base on the first opportunity. Aircraft not designated for the crossing flew day and night over the continent, carrying personnel, general cargo, fuel drums, ammunition, or AM39 Exocet missiles from the Super Etendard aircraft to ensure proper calibration in Puerto Belgrano Naval Base and return it before sunrise. This was in addition to the movements of the HS-125. The pilots' effort rate was high.
The requirements of the islands were constantly increasing and cargo aircraft crossings were becoming more and more difficult to accomplish. F-28 crews experienced compromising situations. The usual one swere Sea Harrier approaches that involved evasive manoeuvres in very lowflight and maximum speed, turning to either side with 45º of wing bank. Generally, the annoying overspeed alarm was activated when exceeding 320 knots. These situations did not build experience, each one was different and accumulated a lot of adrenaline. Concentration was maximum and calm came when the controlling officer indicated that the Harriers were abandoning the approach.
On May 26, 0741/5-T-20, on a dayofpoorvisibility and a VLF-OMEGA with accumulatederrors, dangerously overshot the approach radial by a few miles due to the delay of the VOR start-up. It finally managed to land with three Harrier CAPs in the area. The take off coincided with an air raid warning. Tracer bursts from own anti-aircraft batteries passed close to the airplane with out consequence. Subsequently, it performed evasive tactics in very low flying flight.
On the night of June 2, the Type 42 destroyer HMS Cardiff was stationed alone as missile trap in the vicinity of the airport. The weather on the islands and the mainland was bad. Malvinas Radar did not detect the ship and it fired two Sea Dart missiles at 0742/5-T-21 during its approach. Both missiles were lost in their trajectory and were not noticed by the pilots. The destroyer waited until takeoff and unsuccessfully fired a third missile.
On June 9, on a night of poor visibility, the crew of 0741/ 5-T-20 mistook the lights from vehicles running parallel to the runway for airfield markings and had to make an escape and re-approachin amilitary unsafearea.
On June 11, 0742/5-T-21 made the last landing at Puerto Argentino. On June 13, 0741/5-T-20 attempted another crossing, but had to return due to tactical reasons. The four Aircraft Commanders who were responsible for these missions were the then Lt. Cmdr. Norberto Ulises Pereiro (Commanding officer) and Rubén Darío Gómez (Executive Officer), and the former Commanding Officers, Cmdr. Luis Malnati and Cmdr. Luis Nicolás D'Imperio, who were subordinated by position.
In summary, between April 30 and June 14, the Squadron made 13 flights to the islands and 13 were aborted due to tactical situations. There were no personal or material losses.
The F-28, of commercial design, with engines installed high in the fuselage, strong landing gear, appropriate speed and high technical reliability, proved that in spite of its reduced payload it was a valid element to satisfy the high priority demands. The leadership, professionalism and courage of its crews allowedit to operate efficiently in a variable and immensely hostile tactical scenario.
The Second Naval Air Mobile Logistics Support Squadron was distinguished with the decoration “HONOR TO VALOR IN COMBAT” for: “Contributing to the logistic support of the forces stationed in Malvinas, transporting vital elements for the combat in extreme security conditions, in spite of the blockade imposed by the enemy, the adverse weather conditions and the precarious air navigation facilities”.
Luis Alberto De Vincenti, Naval Aviator,
former F-28 pilot. May, 2025
BIBLIOGRAPHY: De Vincenti, Luis A. 2023. “Malvinas, la noche de los misiles al Fokker 5-T-21”, Boletín del Centro Naval Nº 861. Meunier, Claudio Gustavo. 2012. “Jamás serán Olvidados”. 1ª edición. Grupo Abierto. Roll Out & Línea Ala blogs.
